Beach Haven

Bibliography
Price, Don K. 1965. The Scientific Estate. London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Review by Michael Beach
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For Don Price, there was a shift in America. The original philosophy characterized by Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson. He says there are two main ‘articles of faith’ concerning progress. The first concerns material benefits which “lead society to support the advancement of science and technology” (Price 1965, 1). The other basic belief asserts that advancement in science “would lead society toward desirable purposes, including political freedom” (Ibid.). Price goes on to speak of negative effects of science and technology such as the dust bowl, atomic bombs, and the great depression, all of which were at least influenced by technological and scientific decisions.

“So we are about to reach the point when both scientists and politicians begin to worry not merely about specific issues, but about the theoretical status of science in our political and constitutional system” (Price 1965, 4). Price refers to a government report by Vanevar Bush titled Science, the Endless Frontier. I’ve reviewed that document in the past along with several books critical of it. Price’s overarching theme is that science is intertwined with politics. Not only is there such a concept like political science, but also political issues have some sort of scientific perspective. If in no other way, sociology is a form of science that looks at how social issues and movements form and function. Noting such scientific fields such as physics and genetics, Price makes scientific revolution has more effect on political institutions than the industrial revolution. Here are three specific statements he makes that the rest of the book is based on.

• The scientific revolution is moving the public and private sectors closer together.
• The scientific revolution is bringing a new order of complexity into the administration of public affairs.
• The scientific revolution is upsetting our system of checks and balances.

Essentially, Don Price argues that economic and political power have become so close that he calls them ‘fused’. He also takes the position that both forms of power are inseparable with scientific change.
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Bibliography
​Hausse, Heidi. 2019. "The Locksmith, the Surgeon, and the Mechanical Hand: Communicating Technical Knowledge in Early Modern Europe." Edited by Suzanne Moon. Technology and Culture (Johns Hopkins University Press) 60 (1): 34-64.

Review by Michael Beach
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In this article, Heidi Hausse looks at a specific case of an artificial prosthetic hand designed by a surgeon named Ambroise Paré. He had a representation drawn in a publication called Oeuvers in 1575 A.D. In order to allow for increased circulation of the design, a wood cutting of the picture was created by a locksmith named le petit Lorrain. The cutting was then used to reproduce the technical drawing in many subsequently published medical books and documents. Hausse takes a look at the imprint made by the wood carving and compares it to similar printed carvings. She also explores what the pictures do and don’t convey, and who might make use of the drawings.

A couple of themes come out in Hausse’s writing. Although one might imagine the drawings would be of interest to other surgeons, in reality “artisans were a crucial audience” (Hausse 2019, 36). The technical knowledge transfer was more about replicating the apparatus than for post amputation recuperation of patients. As a result, “substantive exchanges of knowledge took place between artisans and learned men” (Hausse 2019, 37) that might otherwise not happen due to cultural status difference. “The role of craft production in the initial creation of the image allows us to consider its purpose in Paré’s surgical treatise from the perspective of an artisan” (Hausse 2019, 47).

Another theme relates to how historians sometimes question the effectiveness of the early printing press to convey technical knowledge. “Many historians have been skeptical of the printing press’s impact on the transfer of craft techniques” (Hausse 2019, 52). One reason given is the interspersing of words and numbers to clarify graphics which are readily understood by technicians, but less so for surgeons. Another reason for skepticism is that “manuals contained either too little or too much of the information needed for a task, and often omitted practitioners’ tricks” (Ibid.). Finally, such sketches might contain mistakes. A few numbers pointing to specific parts didn’t match the accompanying terms. Finally, the documents many of the people creating the documents didn’t understand how the apparatus worked. Think of those in the supply chain to bring the documents about such as “translators, editors, artists, and printers” (Hausse 2019, 55).

Some of this same skepticism might be leveled on similar modern technical documents. Perhaps the difference comes in how easy documents can be published, then corrected and republished. One point that is a common argument among sociologists of technology is the need for tacit or practical experience, that written documents are just not enough. Just think about how many times you’ve may have opened a cookbook only to understand that some of the process for adding ingredients is not always clear. Watching videos with chefs creating the same dish can be helpful, but nothing can be a substitute for making it yourself. 

Bibliography
​Bloor, David. 1991. Knowledge and Social Imagery. 2nd. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Review by Michael Beach
 
This work by David Bloor repasses the strong program of sociology and the creation of knowledge. He was a proponent of a framework called the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). The strong program suggests that technological advancements are primarily a function of social factors. The alternative, the weak program, doesn’t go so far, but looks at failed technologies and asserts social factors leading to their demise. After making a number of SSK arguments, Bloor looks at mathematics as an example. From the wisdom of the crowds example of ox-weight estimation, to the arguments against crow-sourcing for understanding the world, Bloor shares chapters on ‘naturalistic’ math followed by asking if there can be ‘alternative’ math.

For Bloor, and other proponents of SSK, naturalistic views are partial and don’t go far enough. Over time, other philosophers of science have pointed to Bloor’s own argument vulnerabilities in more or less ignoring technological and scientific effects on society. He admits there is some influence, but describes the influence seemingly like a form of feedback, but not so much as a changing factor. SSK leans away from technological determinism as have many other philosophical frameworks. Perhaps David Bloor and the school of SSK takes that leaning away too far. One argument he makes relates to symmetry. In this specific definition, all ideas should be approach as having equal weight until proven different. He argues “Our everyday attitudes are practical and evaluative, and evaluations are by their nature asymmetrical” (Bloor 1991, 175). Bloor shares examples of other philosophers inducing other forms of symmetry. Bloor’s position of practicality and ‘common sense’ is part of his justification of asymmetry between social influence on technology as opposed to technological influence on society. 
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