Beach Haven

Bibliography
Hawking, Stephen. 2017. A Brief History of Time. New York: Bantam Books.

Review by Michael Beach
 
Stephen Hawking is a well-known astrophysicist, so much so that a novice like me has heard of him. Yes, he was connected to the popular TV show The Big Bang Theory, but I had heard of him long before then. This book is a treatise on the best scientific thinking about the cosmos distilled into more palatable language for the average reader.

Each chapter tackles somewhat ticklish unresolved topics such as the latest descriptions of the universe, the relationship between space and time, the uncertainty principle, and the elementary particles and forces of nature. Whether discussing black holes, the origin of the universe, or worm hole travel, Hawking includes what ‘we’ humans think and what we don’t know. He peppers these heavy topics from well placed humor.

The original version of the book was published in 1988. This third version incorporates ‘new material’ including some short descriptions about the theoretical scientific contributions of Albert Einstein, Galileo Galilei, and Isaac Newton. For me the topics Hawking discusses are fascinating. His approach is thoughtful and clear.  
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BibliographyBerger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Anchor Books.

Review by Michael Beach
 
The “core of the argument” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, v) as described by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman is to contrast several schools of thought related to how we humans understand ‘reality’. Specifically, they show the two primary issues as “society as objective reality” (section 2 of the book) and “society as subjective reality” (section 3 of the book). Another way to consider these two titles would be in the form of a question. Is society something that happens and sociology attempts to describe it, or is society something that results from attempts to describe it?

Although the authors spend some time discussing some ways ‘reality’ can be thought of, they don’t really attempt to create their own definition. They are focused more on social process in either describing or defining how sociological forces interact.

Berger and Luckmann conclude that knowledge is a primary sociological force. “We have tried to present a general and systematic account of the role of knowledge in society” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 185). Not seeking to answer all the questions, they acknowledge a primary goal is to encourage more academic exploration. “Of one thing we are confident. A redefinition of the problems and tasks of the sociology of knowledge was long overdue” (Ibid.).

Their work here attempts to link ‘objectification’, ‘institutionalization’ and ‘legitimation’. They don’t seem to make an argument that societal definition is objectifiable, rather they state that the depiction of objective definition leads to creation of institutional forms of knowledge. They likewise make the case that knowledge considered as institutional is also accepted as legitimate. The other form of that same equation is also arguable. As knowledge becomes more widely accepted as legitimate, such knowledge becomes institutional, even if not codified in some formal organized institution.
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​Bibliography
Kleinman, Daniel Lee, ed. 2000. Science, Technology, & Democracy. New York: State University of New York Press.

Review by Michael Beach
 
Like so many of the books I’ve reviewed as part of my studies in the field of Science, Technology, and Society (STS), this book is a compendium of chapters written as interdependent topics. Daniel Kleinman, as the editor, wrote the introduction and closing chapter. The title of his contribution as the final chapter is Democratizations of Science and Technology. This title hints at the idea that democracy has more than one meaning hence each version of democracy differently influences and is influenced by a given community’s relationship with science and tech.

Some of the chapters are a form of mini case study. For example, there is a chapter about AIDS treatment activism. Another looks at sustainable farming networks, where knowledge sharing among farmers and agriculturalists impact how food begins in our collective food chain. Several chapters consider actor roles such as experts, practitioners, and consumers. These chapters tend to examine how much influence each group has, or how much they are willing to rely on the insights of the other groups. There are a few more generalized philosophical chapters such as how the nuclear family is defined and how that influences technology acceptance. There is a review of federal science and 'human well-being’. Perhaps the most academic chapter is by Sandra Harding. She is a well-known author in STS and generally examines feminist thought. In this section she asks the question how much scientific philosophy should steer or be steered by democratic ideals.

Kleinman’s final chapter is a consideration of public policy and motivation. He concludes, “Scientific, professional, and corporate groups have a strong vested interest in seeing that innovations go forward, and they typically have substantial financial, organizational, and technical resources to invest in pursuing those interests. Most public groups, by contrast, as well as society as a whole, have a much less direct stake in the outcome of given policy choices, and usually can draw on only limited economic and institutional resources” (Kleinman 2000, 162). This is an interesting assertion. Even if ‘the public’ has limited input to direct policy deliberation, they ultimate are consumers (or non-consumers) of whatever technology results. The public votes with its money and its votes. As you might note, these topics are tricky. Any strong stand on one point or another makes for argumentative fodder. 
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Bibliography
Ramsdell, Mike. 2006. A Train to Potevka: An American Spy in Russia. Layton: Zhivago Press.

Review by Michael Beach
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This book is an autobiographical sketch of some experiences of a CIA operative working in Russia in the waning years of the Soviet Union. Mike Ramsdell speaks of his early training days in the agency and how his unit was betrayed by another trainee with whom Ramsdell had a friendship. He tells of his bringing up in northern Utah, his marriage and divorce brought on in part by how much he was away on assignments.

The main story of the book is how his unit in Russia was attempting to turn an official into an asset for the CIA. It goes wrong and his unit is told to bug out. That is, the others in his unit are sent to the relative safety of Moscow. Ramsdell is left alone to finish sanitizing the various locations the group of American spies were using. He is eventually ordered to take a train to a safe house in the far away village of Potevka. Before he can make his get away, Ramsdell is attacked by local thugs. He escapes the assassination attempt, but barely. He is beaten and seriously injured. In this rough condition he gets on the train in a lot of pain. It’s the slow train that stops often with the lowest class ticket. He ruminates about his life and what seems to him like abandonment by the agency. As he slept, another passenger steels what little food he had, leaving him to travel for days hungry and bloodied.

Eventually he arrives only to find the safe house empty and with no food. Eventually villagers help him, but not at first. He speaks of how the local people have little for themselves because of the bad policies of the Soviet government. Several times he is stalked by wolves that at one point keep him from walking from the house to the outhouse to relieve himself. After a long stay in the bitter cold and deprivation that included Christmas, he eventually makes his way to rescue and a return to the United States.

Throughout the ordeal, Ramsdell was sustained by his memory of his relationship with his son and a coworker who later becomes his girlfriend and future wife. He wrote to them and imagined future times together. He also considered his own perspective about God and his faith. The humbling experiences at first caused him to question, but then he was drawn closer to God and found his faith growing.

The story is an interesting mix of spy thriller, introspection, and social commentary with a religious connection. Since I lived part of my life in northern Utah, I was familiar with the places he describes. I also made two work-related trips to far eastern Siberia, but after the fall of the Soviet Union. I can see his perspective offering praise and sympathy to the Russian people while questioning their government as well as our own.
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Bibliography
Winner, Langdon. 1986. The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Review by Michael Beach
 
In this work, Langdon Winner considers a mix of nature and technology in the area of San Luis Obispo, CA where he grew up. In Diablo Canyon, as a child he had enjoyed the ocean and the occasional view of the whales as they migrated close to shore through the area. As an adult he visited again to take a tour of the construction site of a new nuclear power plant. Given his academic background reading “history, politics, and philosophy,” he found himself, “drawn, quite unexpectedly, to questions concerning technology” (Winner 1986, 166). Seeing the juxtaposition of the wild and the technical in close proximity in Diablo Canyon became a natural curiosity for him.

The first two sections include a review of some of the questions under examination in the field of the philosophy of science. While reviewing prominent publications along these lines, he progresses to consider how we tend to characterize newer forms of technology. For example, is the goal to ‘build a better mousetrap’? Winner considers decentralization of technological ‘progress’ and helps the reader sort through information about technology. How much of what we learn is factual and how much myth? How do we know the difference?

Langdon Winner finishes this book with a focus on exploring what we scholars of Science, Technology, and Society (STS) refer to as ‘boundary work’. In this case, what is ‘natural’ and what is not. He points out how some argue that when it comes to technological change, “this is the natural way; here is the path nature itself sets before us” (Winner 1986, 121). Still others contend, “what we are doing is horribly contrary to nature; we must repair our ways or stand condemned by the most severe tribunals” (Ibid.). Langdon walks through some of the major questions these two simple polarized perspectives unleash. What morals are in play here? How does one define what is ‘natural’ and what isn’t? Is ‘nature’ a pile of stock goods to be exploited? Is it something that requires taming through conquest? How much human intervention causes something to move between the boundary of natural and not natural? The ideas around many of these sorts of questions are considered by Winner.

From an STS perspective, Langdon Winner uses the use-case of how the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant contrasts with what was there before. He notes, for example, that prior to the power plant there were farms and orchards all along the coast, and they are still there. How natural is agriculture as compared to ‘wild’ vegetation? For me as a reader, the arguments are helpful if not clarifying. I think any time we intend to modify our world, such issues should be considered. At the same time, we can’t be so concerned about changing anything that we are unable to meet the needs of humanity. Power consumption is very real. Our modern Western civilization is dependent on it. Nuclear energy is less of a pollutant form, unless there is some sort of unintended accident in the future. Then it can do more damage than alternative methods. Nothing is free impact or free of risk. Winner asks for consideration while exploring limits and balancing benefits and impacts. 
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​Bibliography
Covey, Stephen R. 1990. Principle-Centered Leadership. New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: Simon & Schuster.
 
Review by Michael Beach

This is a follow-on publication to Stephen R. Covey’s 7-Habits work, which I reviewed some time ago. Many of the principles noted in this book were referred to in the earlier work, but here they are the focus and are better organized.

Covey describes alternate life centers as “work, pleasure, friends, enemies, spouse, family, self, church, possessions, money, and so on” (Covey 1990, 21). Our principles will be grounded on our focus. These alternate centers he groups in four areas: security, guidance, wisdom, and power. Our principles influence our life centers and vice versa.

After a brief review of the 7-habits and an explanation of this life-center framework, the rest of the book in general is an expansion of each of the ideas in the framework. He divides the book into two large sections. The first he calls Person and Interpersonal Effectiveness. The second he calls Managerial and Organizational Development. Toward the end of the second section he reviews another popular framework known as Total Quality Management (TQM). One prominent author of this movement was W. Edwards Deming. Covey maps Deming’s '14 points' of TQM onto his 7 habits and his principles framework. This book is a useful companion to Covey’s earlier work, and as before, includes practical examples from different parts of life, not exclusively business.

​Bibliography
Latour, Bruno. 2005. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.

Review by Michael Beach

As the subtitle suggests, Bruno Latour explains the main discussion points in this specific framework. In the discipline of Science, Technology, and Society (STS), Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) is widely adopted in terms of how to view interactions of people, organizations, and artifacts in making policy and technology choices. Unlike some of the other social frameworks, Latour argues that the adoption and stability of a given scientific fact or technological artifact is a function of the strength of the networks that support them. For Latour, fact or artifact selection results if more actors (people) or actants (objects) interact on a consistent basis than competing facts or artifacts. If the strength of a network begins to wain in relation to different facts or artifacts, then a theory or technology is supplanted. Context for Latour is less important. Context may influence parts of a network, but contexts differ among network nodes (actors or actants), and they also change over time. He puts less weight to social factors that may seem stable in some ways. Instead it is how much actors and actants tend to support a given policy, technology, or scientific finding that will determine how stable it tends to be.

Latour argues “sociology has confused science with politics” (253). When discussing what influences a network, he further states, “it makes no difference if it’s ‘natural’ or ‘social’” (Ibid.). One way to think about it, when actants are involved, there is no ‘social’ effect on such. Natural resources are an example. Efficiency is more a question in terms of human use of non-renewable resources, yet renewables can be overtaxed as well. The resources themselves impact network choices but are not influenced directly by social forces.

ANT has been shown to have weaknesses that even Latour admits. For example, ANT does not consider non-users. When the cost of a specific technology excludes people living in poverty, there are perspectives excluded that might offer improvement. Lower costs and fewer options might add user count, especially if many of the options are not really used by purchasers of the more expensive versions of technology. How many channels of TV do people actually view of the hundreds they pay for through some service? Today we might think the song lyrics “57 channels and nothin’ on” rather quaint. Who has a service with only 57 channels? One could also argue that if ANT is less interested in 'context', wouldn't a network itself constitute a form of context?

Bruno Latour’s ANT lens can be applied to many aspects of life. Essentially he argues that facts and artifacts most supported by a network of people and things will win, even if they cost more, are less efficient, and not universally available. 

Bibliography
​Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Translated by Mark Ritter. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Washington DC: Sage.

Review by Michael Beach

In this book, Ulrich Beck weighs in on ‘modernity’. There are camps that say we have not become ‘modern’ yet. Others are proponents of modernism. Still others argue in favor of Western civilization in terms of post-modernism. Beck states his intent. “This book is an attempt to track down the word ‘post’, alternately called ‘late’ or ‘trans’” (Beck 1992, 9). He makes it clear his point of reference is modernism and modernist perspectives on risk.

In this work, Beck tackles risk as it relates to wealth distribution, politics, class, the family, institution, and various kinds of standards to name a few. He finishes up with an important section on what he calls 'reflexive modernization'. For those who espouse this framework, rather than defining crumbling tradition as post-modern, they argue the rise of new traditions and institutions establishing a new modernism. For example, national level definitions are giving way to ideas such as globalization. New modernity advocates support more independence as divorce rates rise. They advocate for less dependence on religion and other traditional forms of social construct. Ulrich Beck is looking at how views on risk are shifting along with these social changes.  

In the end, Beck looks at science. In a chapter titled Science beyond Truth and Enlightenment he makes the case that risk views depend on “scientific and social construction” (Beck 1992, 155). He claims “science is one of the causes, the medium of definition and the source of solutions to risks” (Ibid.). He then offers four theses on scientization. Sociologists studying science have argued over definitions of scientization. To what degree of faith does one put into science as compared to other forms of knowledge creation? Lesser dependence on social factors in determining ‘reality’ increases dependence on science. Like many sociologist, I question total dependence on science. So does Beck, but he is less concerned about the degree of dependence on science, and more concerned with how the degree of scientization influences views on risk.

Beck’s comparisons between classic and reflexive views of modernism contribute to shifting views on risk. Views of both modernism and risk are not monolith. In the world of Venn charts, both views exist together, and individuals may accept both depending on their participation in different communities. For example, in the world of project management or engineering, risk is often associated with negative impacts to desired outcomes. There are actuarial spreadsheet approaches to calculate probability and impact of any given potential risk. These same practitioners may view social risk in their non-work lives more reflexively, accepting subjective meanings over numerical ones. Beck explores many such issues, but always within the framework of varying definitions of modernity.

Bibliography
​Tallbear, Kim. 2013. Native American DNA: Tribal Belonging and the False Promise of Genetic Science. Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press.
 
Review by Michael Beach

Kim Tallbear is one of my favorite authors related to my studies in science, technology, and society (STS). The title of this work is self-explanatory, but the topics she covered are varied, and certainly explores ideas new to me.

One of overarching themes relates to how human test material such as blood samples have been used in the past in ways not agreed to by the subjects. Often banks of samples and data are sold to companies that develop treatments or further databases that yield not only medical findings, but revenues that come with them.

Tallbear also looks at the accuracy of DNA testing to find one’s ancestry. Such services have become popular in the private sector. There are many reasons to hold such findings suspect, and Tallbear reviews some of the technical issues. In terms of Native Americans, many of the issues are more social than technical. For example, there are specific government benefits for people who can document a native ancestry. Likewise, there is risk to those who claim native heritage when DNA tests don’t support their claim. Another difficulty the author has with native DNA testing is how many people claim specific tribal affiliation based on results. In reality, tribes intermingled so much through economic and warfare activity that it is difficult at best to narrow DNA categories in this way.

The problematic aspects Tallbear raises about DNA testing can be more generalized in two area as she does. The first happens when science and business are tied to each other. She points to the example of the genographic project (mapping the human gene structure) and ‘the business of research and representation’. Others have broached how science represents ‘facts’. Ian Hacking looks at the same issues from a philosophical perspective. He refers to the issues as ‘representing and intervening’. Likewise, Sheila Jasanoff created an entire framework that includes the idea of ‘controlling narratives’.

Tallbear finishes with a look at governance. Who can decide what’s appropriate use and language? Once collected, who owns human genetic tissue? She shares other complicating questions that are still unanswered. Even with modernized legal documents about what sort of rights research subjects cede when they sign a specific document, court cases continue. For example, if a company purchases data or samples from an academic study, then creates large revenues from that resource, are donors entitled to some of it? What part does race play in subject selection? How do scientists define a specific narrow population? How much isolation is required, or intermixing is acceptable, to make the samples be representative of a specific population? As the reader might imagine, such questions can continue. These are ethical concerns for scientists, and often cause ‘native’ people to be unwilling to trust them.
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Bibliography
​Bloor, David. 1991. Knowledge and Social Imagery. 2nd. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Review by Michael Beach
 
This work by David Bloor repasses the strong program of sociology and the creation of knowledge. He was a proponent of a framework called the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). The strong program suggests that technological advancements are primarily a function of social factors. The alternative, the weak program, doesn’t go so far, but looks at failed technologies and asserts social factors leading to their demise. After making a number of SSK arguments, Bloor looks at mathematics as an example. From the wisdom of the crowds example of ox-weight estimation, to the arguments against crow-sourcing for understanding the world, Bloor shares chapters on ‘naturalistic’ math followed by asking if there can be ‘alternative’ math.

For Bloor, and other proponents of SSK, naturalistic views are partial and don’t go far enough. Over time, other philosophers of science have pointed to Bloor’s own argument vulnerabilities in more or less ignoring technological and scientific effects on society. He admits there is some influence, but describes the influence seemingly like a form of feedback, but not so much as a changing factor. SSK leans away from technological determinism as have many other philosophical frameworks. Perhaps David Bloor and the school of SSK takes that leaning away too far. One argument he makes relates to symmetry. In this specific definition, all ideas should be approach as having equal weight until proven different. He argues “Our everyday attitudes are practical and evaluative, and evaluations are by their nature asymmetrical” (Bloor 1991, 175). Bloor shares examples of other philosophers inducing other forms of symmetry. Bloor’s position of practicality and ‘common sense’ is part of his justification of asymmetry between social influence on technology as opposed to technological influence on society. 
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