Beach Haven

Bibliography
Wilde, Oscar. 2011. The Picture of Dorian Gray. Orlando: Seth Watkins.

​Review by Michael Beach

This book was originally published in 1891. Oscar Wilde was an Irish author, born in Dublin. Before reading it, I was vaguely familiar with the story, but as expected, there is so much more to it. In the beginning, Dorian Gray is a handsome young man who acts as a model for an artist's portraiture in Victorian London. The artist, Basil Hallward, was so smitten with the painting he decided not to sell it, but eventually gave it to Dorian who displayed it in his home.

At first Dorian Gray is naive, almost innocent. The combination of flattering words from Basil and philosophical enticing of his other friend, Lord Henry, who espoused hedonism, tempts him into an ever growing self-absorbed and malicious lifestyle. As he goes down this track he notices changes to the picture. Every time he does something evil, the image in the picture changes. The painted face absorbs the negative effect of his bad behavior. Over time, those around him age and degenerate, as does the picture image, but the man himself stays exactly as he was at the time the painting was created. The painting becomes the image of the evil man he grows into.

As he notices the changes, he removes the painting to a room where he keeps it locked and covered with a cloth. He begins to fear it and rarely looks at it. He becomes ever more depraved and is nearly found out, yet he continues to avoid detection or any sort of ill-effect. Eventually he commits several murders including the brother of a girl who commits suicide after he despoils and dumps her. He later murders the painter of the portrait when Hallward insists on seeing it again after many years. Finally, Dorian wants to reform. His version of doing a good deed is to tempt a young farm girl, then refrain from going through with debauching her. After explaining to Lord Henry how he is turning a new leaf and becoming good, his friend explains that he is only doing it to appease his own vanity. Dorian becomes enraged, then realizes that Lord Henry is right. He believes he is beyond reform. He decides to destroy the picture and grabs the same knife he used to murder Basil Hallward. He is found dead on the ground of the room where the portrait stands. Gray is on the floor with the knife in his chest with all the disfigurement caused by his deeds, while the portrait has returned to its original youthful version of himself.

Oscar Wilde is playing on the inner conflict we all share of good and evil. In this story, neither good nor evil win so much as evil ultimately loses. 
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Bibliography
​Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Translated by Catherine Porter. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Review by Michael Beach

Bruno Latour, among other things, was a French sociologist of science. This specific work was originally published in French in 1991. In the field of Science, Technology, and Society (STS) he is among the canonical authors. Depending on one’s philosophical bent, society, at least western society, finds itself in either a modernist or post-modernist world. The basic argument of Latour, as the title hints, is that neither is true. We are not modern in the sociological sense, and having never been so, we are also not post-modern.

Latour shares many definitions that have surfaced in explaining modernism. Latour points to the pattern in such definitions as comparative between ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’. In this approach there is a winner and loser as modern supplants ancient. He argues, however, such arguments don’t reveal whether the new defeats the old or if it just brings past revolution “to fruition” (Latour 1993, 10). One aim of this work is to take on “the task of studying scientists and politicians in tandem since no central vantage point has seemed to exist” (Latour 1993, 13). Modernism can be looked at in many ways. Latour considers art, architecture, and scientific process among others. For Latour, modernism creates a dividing line between “the natural world and the social world” (Ibid.).

In this work, the author examines a famous debate between ‘natural philosophers’ such as Thomas Hobbes, and the ‘empiricists’ like Robert Boyle. The argument puts Hobbes on one side in which the world is defined through thought experiment and the theoretical. On the other side, Boyles defines science as finding truth about the natural world through planned experiments. At the heart of the debate is which brings us closer to truth. Modernism in science looks to support empiricism over philosophy. For Latour, that leaves out the influence that each has on each other. For example, experiments are formulated and carried out based on theories and assumptions constructed over time, and theories and assumptions are shaped by former experiments.

Bruno Latour is arguing for symmetry over asymmetry. “When Georges Canguilhem distinguishes scientific ideologies from true sciences, he asserts not only that it is impossible to study Darwin – the scientist – and Diderot – the ideologue – in the same terms, but that it must be impossible to lump them together” (Latour 1993, 92). Latour then argues for symmetry between the two approaches arguing that they are inextricably connected.  On page 135 is a table arguing what parts of both modernist and post-modernist approaches should be maintained, and which rejected, in order to describe a symmetrical approach that Latour argues that is more reflective of how the social and the scientific actually interact with each other to form our current scientific and technologically influenced world.
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Bibliography
​Scott, J. C. (1998). Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 

Review by Michael Beach
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As the title implies, James C. Scott references several national policies in different economic and political universes that claimed to seek the betterment of the people living within a given sphere of control. Then, Scott goes on to discuss some of the failures within his example state policies. His focus is on policies that are adopted from the perspective of ‘high modernism’, or in other words, highly planned and symbolic communities as opposed to those whose growth is more organic.

Scott defines high-modernism as clean, sharp, repetitious, and completely planned. For example, one can drive around a subdivision in America and every house looks the same with every yard laid out in a way that keeps the ominous HOA off the back of the homeowner. More organic cities and neighborhoods are those that are more post-modern where each is unique, and the growth seems hodge-podge and random. Scott compares public policy and the effects of high-modernist and post-modernist with various art movements that followed similar courses.

The two main examples Scott uses are the Soviet Union collectivization, compulsory villagization in Tanzania. In each case the hoped-for outcomes were less than desired. People resisted the government efforts resulting in police-state approaches. For Scott, these examples show “how routinely planners ignore the radical contingency of the future” (Scott, 1998, p. 343). One of the fallacies he points out is how in planning there is a need for “standardizing the subjects of development” (p. 345). By assuming all the people to be roughly the same then planners can create buildings, parks, roads, market areas, etc. the same. Other things need to be standardized as well such as assumptions about weather, geologic forces, external economic effects, or other social movements that are guessed to be more or less the same in the future as they have been in the past.

Scott makes a plea for what he calls ‘metis-friendly institutions’. Those institutions that are tasked with planning should be “multifunctional, plastic, diverse, and adaptable” (p. 353). The issue he has with high-modernism is its general approach at simplifying the variables it plans for. Instead of one-size-fits-all, he is advocating for more voices in the process and a willingness to let go of efficiency in the name of sameness.

Bibliography
​Fromm, E. (1966). Marx's Concept of Man. New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co.

It’s clear in this work that Erich Fromm is a Marx apologist, or maybe better said advocate. There is a portion of the work that deals with Fromm’s biography who forwent his Jewish roots for an atheistic position in the Marxist tradition. The main body of this book is a translation of some of Marx’s economic and philosophic manuscripts. These were translated by T.B. Bottomore of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Fromm comments on those works and offers separately statements about Marx that were published by family and colleagues who knew him.

Perhaps the point Fromm puts the most effort into within his arguments is how one cannot judge Marx’s ideas by the applications that resulted in government systems such as in Russia, China, or Cuba. What makes that position difficult for this reviewer is that as one reads the actual words of Marx, these particular examples certainly line up philosophically. The actual economic policies each has adopted vary some, but not so much as Fromm tries to express. He tries to show how the Soviets for example distory Marxian theory. Though he makes some reasoned arguments, he really does not directly show examples where such philosophies differ so much as individual policy application when the practical use of Marxist theories prove unworkable in real life. Such positions seem less to support Marx’s specific views as they stand for evidence to counter his views. Fromm’s focus tends to be about Marx’s humanist views and his arguments against religion, even any sort of religious belief. His support for secularism goes beyond secular government and reaches into secularism within the lives of individuals.

The other argument Erich Fromm tends to point to is about western ignorance of the basic tenants of Marxist views. Indeed, most Americans I would think do not have a deep understanding of the Marxist political and philosophical sophistry. Even someone like me with only a cursory study could not claim the sort of insights a Marxist scholar might. On the other hand, most do have some idea of the overarching differences between a Communist and capitalist system, even if the variations of socialism and communism might be lost on many of us.
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If one has an academic curiosity to understand some Marxist philosophical arguments there are some insights her, but take it with a grain of salt. It’s clear Fromm has a specific position so his reasonings are guided by that position.

 

BibliographyKaiser, David. 2011. How the Hippies Saved Physics: Science, Counterculture, and the Quantum Revival. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company.

Reviewed by Michael Beach 

The title of this book makes the topic quite clear. David Kaiser compares the state of theoretical physics post World War II (particular the 1960s and 1970s) as compared with pre-war science. In particular he looks at a group that formed primarily at UC Berkeley known as the Fundamental Fysics Group (sic). Members of this at first informal group were generally trained in traditional experimental physics, but longed for the days of European salons of the 1920s and 1930s that included the likes of Albert Einstein and Michael Polanyi where one was more free to speculate.

The author makes a central point how in order to advance understanding, “a critical mass of researchers needed to embrace a different mode of doing physics” (Kaiser 2011, xiv). “They had to incorporate philosophy, interpretation, even bald speculation back into their daily routine” (Ibid.).

Members of the Berkeley interlocutors embraced ‘new age’ ideas around eastern mysticism, spiritualism, and the like. They looked to link physics with human psychological power through use of experimental drugs, among other empirical approaches. They called this sort of ‘science’ after the Greek letter psi with a goal “to plumb the foundations of quantum mechanics in search of explanations for parapsychological… phenomena: extrasensory perception, psychokinesis, the works” (Kaiser 2011, 65).

So how did the group of mostly grad students and dropouts employ ‘drugs, sex, and rock-n-roll’ to ‘revive’ theoretical physics? After WWII, most practitioners of physics were focused on empiricism and number crunching. The work was not appealing to the book’s documented physicists who fancied themselves above what Thomas Kuhn called ‘normal science’. They were looking to create revolutionary ideas in the tradition of Einstein. Their group discussions often revolved around ‘Bell’s Theorem’ that postulates how “quantum mechanics worked impeccably ‘for all practical purposes’” (Kaiser 2011, 25). Success of a number of them waxed and waned. Some of them produced very popular books. There was a great deal of focus on mental performances by the likes of Uri Geller. As the hype gained more notoriety, a number of debunkers emerged. One of the primary members, Ira Einhorn emerged as a sort of leader and guru to the group, and to non-physicists who shared similar interests. Unfortunately, Einhorn spiraled downward. He eventually killed his girlfriend and fled to Europe to avoid prosecution. Physics as an industry began to be less funded, and psi topics in particular became eschewed. Members of the group who did not get wealthy on their earlier popular books were forced to seek other ways to make a living including taking on everyday jobs.
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Kaiser notes how more recently a sort of resurgence of theoretical physics is upon us, and some members of the Fundamental Fysics Group have reemerged in the field. In general, they are avoiding the link with parapsychology. Event he idea of ‘psi’ has changed. The group no longer exists, but some of its early participants redubbed a more modern version as “PSI: Physical Sciences Institute” (Kaiser 2011, 241). One might recognize later versions of physics speculation in the form of ideas like chaos theory or the more recently debated string theory. 

Vasquez, Robinson. 2021. Prepare My People for the Singularity: Surviving the Dark Side of the Artificial Intelligence Revolution. Monee, IL: Robinson Vasquez.

Review by Michael Beach
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I struggle with this particular review. This is because I actually know the author. The base assumption to the work is that the singularity is inevitable and will happen soon. The idea of ‘singularity’ refers to the point at which artificial intelligence (AI) systems become sentient and begin to act independent of programming created by humans. Most of the first half of the book makes a case for these two premises in a largely technological determinism argument. The literature and thought of most who study socio-technical issues have left technological determinism behind for several decades now. It’s simply not true that technology advances independent of human choice. It’s not clear that ‘advances’ is even accurate. It seems clear there is technological change over time, but advancement assumes the change is toward some desired outcome. The very linking of change with human goals shows that technical change will follow an inevitable path.

Later in the book, Vasquez makes a shift. He starts discussing how people can avoid a malignant outcome of the singularity. This would put into question his earlier arguments in favor of determinism. Vasquez also speaks to how ‘governments’, ‘corporations’, and ‘churches’ make decisions or could intervene. Such organizations are not independent entities any more than AI is. Organizations are groups of people who interact with each other in a prescribed way. Corporations don’t decide things, rather people within a corporation decide.

Robinson Vasquez even begins linking AI singularity with Christian views of the second coming of the Messiah, Jesus Christ. He wonders if Christ might even come in the form of an AI, or at least communicate with humans through an AI. He finishes the work advocating for ‘prepper’ actions such as hoarding supplies and obtaining remote property to which one might retreat as AI attacks human civilization. In deed, many arguments he makes are direct references to science fiction works and sees dystopian versions as predictive.

The first half and second half of the book would seem to disagree with each other. I find the idea of a singularity and of its inevitability as unfounded. There are certainly many who have made these arguments, and some of them very highly visible proponents. There is a famous example when an AI invented a unique language in order to carry out its programming in a more efficient way. None of these examples make a sure argument. Many others working in the field of AI make arguments against the idea of a singularity. Although there are some interesting ideas in this book, they are just that… ideas. Much of the logic is muddled. 

Foucault, Michel. 1975. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the prison. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: Random House, Inc.
 
The work creates a link between the perspectives of a given historical social milieu in France and the choices French society made (and makes) about how to conduct judicial and penal activities. Foucault makes the argument how in feudal France, judicial proceedings were largely closed to the public, and the execution of sentence was the opposite. Punishment was all about the spectacle. As French society morphed to more democratic morays, the opposite happened. In contemporary France trials are open to the public, and sentences are largely away from the public gaze.

The author asserts much of the shift is a function of accountability and power. Public display of brutal executions helped keep others in check, at least so the theory goes. Yet crime still happened so one could question the effectiveness of public executions. Foucault points to a balancing act by despots to allow enough public spectacle to instill fear without going so far as to seem unfair, inspiring general insurrection. In the days of kingship, the people were accountable to power. In more modern democratic societies, leadership is more accountable to the people. Many argue if this is really true, but Foucault makes the point of the technology of evermore specific legal codes which in many ways proscribe judges from arbitrariness.

A key point Michel Foucault makes is how punishment has shifted from the specific punishment to fit the crime, to generic punishment for any crime. For example, in feudal France, it would be common for a thief to have his hand(s) cut off. Today, all go to some form of prison and the only variation is the length of stay. The one modern exception to prison sentences is use of the death penalty, yet there are many legal ways to make actual execution a reality for most convicts. Likewise, all forms of execution are the same, not varied based on the specifics of the crime.

On last point I’ll share relates to the intent of punishment. In early France, motive was not considered. Crime x received punishment y. Punishment was to the body with the hopes of creating repentance within the assumed criminal. Because the spectacle was as much for the observers as for the convicted, it was not unusual for penalties to continue post-mortem. For example, a person may be strangled unto death, then disemboweled, drawn and quartered, and body parts put on public display. In such an example, the prisoner is dead after step one yet the punishment went on. Pre-execution torture was intended to extract a confession, but Foucault notes how it was understood such confessions could be false, so other forms of evidence were required for conviction. Confession would not lessen the punishment as it was only one form of evidence, and was more intended to help the sinner repent than it was for proof of culpability.

In modern times, intent or sanity are important parts of sentencing. Just as the old way was to help reform the sinner in the next life, in modern times we look to help heal the soul in this life. In this way we have adopted sentences that involve confinement in mental institutions for example. Foucault sees psychiatric efforts to confirm the accused mental state at the time of the crime, or their ability to stand trial as modern-day technologies of the court system.

The final section of the book focuses on the technology of a panoptic physical prison and the psychological effects such an experiment had on prisoners. I wrote a blog post early about panopticism. Here is the link:

http://bhaven.org/blog/the-modern-virtual-global-panopticon

​One final comment. Michel Foucault links many of the disciplinary processes and attitudes used in the penal system with those used in hospitals, the military, and schools. Each of these have a need for regimentation and hierarchy on a large scale. All claim their effort to be for the public good. 

Nye, David E. 2007. Technology Matters: Questions to Live With. Cambridge & London: The MIT Press.

As the subtitle suggests, David Nye poses a series of philosophical questions focused on ideas related to technology. Perhaps the first is the biggest; what is technology? Regardless how one approaches this question the answers are essentially ambiguous. Important arguments throughout the work confirm that humans, humanity, and technology are inextricably connected.

Here is a list of the other big questions Nye pursues, each as individual chapters. Does technology control us? Is technology predictable? How do historians understand technology? Does technology inspire cultural uniformity or diversity? Does technology contribute to sustainable abundance or ecological crisis? How does technology affect how we work (do we work more, less, better or worse)? Should ‘the market’ select technologies? Does technology bring more security or escalate danger? Through technology do we expand consciousness or encapsulate it? Will technology lead to an inevitable future, or are there many potential outcomes?

All of these questions have many-sided arguments, and all the arguments have a number of proponents offering nuanced perspectives. In this work, David Nye brings out good representation of the many camps addressing the questions. Nye offers a philosophical examination of how technology and humanity interact and influence each other. As one might guess about a philosophy-focused treatise, there are no real final answers, and plenty of opportunity for the reader to take sides.

De Musset, Alfred. 1903 & 1917. The Story of a White Blackbird. Vol. 13, in The Harvard Classics Shelf of Fiction, edited by Charles W. Eliot and William Allan Neilson, translated by Katharine Royce, 391-426. New York: PF Collier & Son.
 
Review by Michael Beach
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This story is an allegory, perhaps maybe autobiographical. The main character is also the narrator, telling his own story. A little blackbird is rejected by his family when white plumage begins to show on its body. Eventually the family leaves him to himself. In his sadness, he travels to seek a new tribe. A number of bird families initially open their flock to him until they discover that he is actually a blackbird. Then they want nothing to do with him. He ventures about through a number of different animal species seeking a new tribe. The pattern is the same, initial acceptance ending in eventual rejection because he is, after all, a blackbird.

The blackbird’s attitude grows steadily more and more gloomy until he hears two birds speaking. One says to the other, “If you ever succeed, I will make you a present of a white blackbird!” He comes to recognize that he is less an oddity and more a rarity. His life then turns for the better as he comes to depend on himself, and is less concerned about finding a tribe.

The work is written in a way that can appeal to children as a simple story, yet adults can read many philosophical and sociological threads within it as well. 

​SCIENCE IN ACTION
By Bruno Latour
Harvard University Press, 1987, 274 pages
Review by Michael Beach
 
Subtitled How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society, Latour claims that as scientific ideas become generally accepted they are ‘black boxed’ (taken for granted in future knowledge claims). In what later becomes known as actor-network theory (ANT) his thesis is that knowledge is not linear discovery, but rather the building of supportive relationships among actors (human or otherwise), creating a web of idea dependency among scientific communities. The author seeks to describe the need to follow the closure of scientific controversies in order to understand the nature of knowledge production.
 
Latour seeks to link himself with scientists, and those who study aspects of science, he himself using the scientific method to study practitioners of the scientific method. In the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), this is a seminal work as it introduces a link between the philosophical perspective such as the social construction of knowledge, with the practical need for scientists to enlist others for consensus and adaptation. Unfortunately, the idea that knowledge is a function of the strength of actor relationships leaves out the potential of black boxing what at some future point turns out to be untrue.
 
As mentioned above this is foundational STS work as paradigmatically shifted away from the idea of linear knowledge advancement through discovery. ANT takes into account all forces at work in the knowledge creation process, including non-human participants.